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Abstract 
Dynamic causal modelling (DCM) is a generic Bayesian framework for inferring hidden neuronal 
states from measurements of brain activity.  It provides posterior estimates of neurobiologically 
interpretable quantities such as the effective strength of synaptic connections among neuronal 
populations and their context‐dependent modulation.  DCM is increasingly used in the analysis 
of a wide range of neuroimaging and electrophysiological data.  Given the relative complexity of 
DCM, compared to conventional analysis techniques, a good knowledge of its theoretical 
foundations is needed to avoid pitfalls in its application and interpretation of results.  By 
providing good practice recommendations for DCM, in the form of ten simple rules, we hope 
that this article serves as a helpful tutorial for the growing community of DCM users. 
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Introduction 
Over the last two decades, neuroimaging analyses have become progressively refined and 
sophisticated.  For example, there has been a trend away from the analysis of manually defined 
regions of interest to whole‐brain analyses; from classical frequentist statistics to Bayesian 
hypothesis testing; and, most recently, efforts to construct mechanistic models of brain 
function.  A representative of the latter is dynamic causal modelling (DCM), a generic approach 
for inferring hidden (unobserved) neuronal states from measured brain activity.  DCM was 
introduced in 2003 for fMRI data (Friston et al., 2003) and made available as open source 
software within the Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) software.  The mathematical basis and 
implementation of DCM for fMRI have since been refined and extended repeatedly (Friston et 
al., 2007; Kiebel et al., 2007; Marreiros et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2007c).  
Dynamic causal models (DCMs)1 have also been implemented for a range of measurement 
techniques other than fMRI, including electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography 
(MEG), and local field potentials (LFPs) obtained from invasive recordings in humans or animals; 
both in the time domain (Daunizeau et al., 2009b; David et al., 2006; Kiebel et al., 2006) and 
frequency domain (Chen et al., 2008; Moran et al., 2007; Moran et al., 2008; Moran et al., 2009; 
Penny et al., 2009b).   
DCMs are generative models of brain responses, which provide posterior estimates of 
neurobiologically interpretable quantities such as the effective strength of synaptic connections 
among neuronal populations and their context‐dependent modulation.  They are defined by five 
key features.  First, DCMs are dynamic, using (linear or nonlinear) differential equations for 
describing (hidden) neuronal dynamics.  Second, they are causal in the sense of control theory, 
i.e. they describe how dynamics in one neuronal population cause dynamics in another, and 
how these interactions are modulated by experimental manipulations or endogenous brain 
activity.  Third, DCMs strive for neurophysiological interpretability.  Fourth, they use a 
biophysically motivated and parameterised forward model to link the modelled neuronal 
dynamics to specific features of measured data (for example, regional hemodynamic time series 
                                                            
1 We use the acronym "DCM" both to refer to the general approach (dynamic causal modeling) and to 
refer to the instantiation of a specific dynamic causal model. 
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in fMRI or spectral densities of electrophysiological data).  Fifth, DCMs are Bayesian in all 
aspects.  Each parameter is constrained by a prior distribution, which reflects empirical 
knowledge about the range of possible parameter values, principled considerations (e.g. certain 
parameters cannot have negative values) or a conservative attitude (e.g. “shrinkage” priors that 
express the assumption that coupling parameters are zero).  Furthermore, Bayesian inversion 
not only provides posterior densities for each model parameter but also yields an approximation 
to the log model evidence which is used to compare alternative DCMs of the same data. 
Since their introduction in 2003, DCM has gradually become part of mainstream neuroimaging 
analysis techniques.  At the time of submitting this article (September 2009), the database 
PubMed listed more than 100 published papers on DCM.  Its applications have concerned a wide 
range of domains in cognitive neuroscience, including language (Allen et al., 2008; Bitan et al., 
2005; Leff et al., 2008; Noppeney et al., 2008; Schofield et al., 2009), motor processes (Eickhoff 
et al., 2005; Grefkes et al., 2008; Grol et al., 2007), vision and visual attention (Fairhall and Ishai, 
2007; Haynes et al., 2005; Mechelli et al., 2003; Sonty et al., 2007), memory (Smith et al., 2006), 
perceptual decision‐making (Stephan et al., 2007b; Summerfield et al., 2006; Summerfield and 
Koechlin, 2008) and learning (den Ouden et al., 2009a; Garrido et al., 2008; Garrido et al., 2009).  
Given the relative complexity of DCM, compared to conventional analyses, many colleagues in 
the neuroimaging community have expressed an interest in a tutorial‐like guide that addresses 
some of the most common questions about the theoretical foundations and empirical 
applications of DCM.  This paper represents an attempt to provide such a tutorial.  It follows a 
recent tradition in the neuroimaging literature, inspired by the popular “10 simple rules” series 
in PLoS Computational Biology (Bourne, 2005), which has led to tutorial papers on, for example, 
voxel based morphometry (Ridgway et al., 2008) and on reporting results from mass‐univariate 
analyses (Poldrack et al., 2008). 
In this paper, we provide some generic "good practice" recommendations that address key 
conceptual and methodological issues in applying DCM to fMRI, EEG, MEG or LFP 
measurements.  Omitting any equations, we have tried to keep these recommendations as 
straightforward as possible.  The suggestions made in this paper should not be mistaken as 
dogmatic rules; instead, they are meant to provide guidelines for those users who are new to 
dynamic system theory, Bayesian statistics and model selection procedures.  Furthermore, some 
of the points below, such as the section on causality, are not concrete rules but outline the 
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conceptual foundations of DCM. We anticipate that some of these guidelines and their 
underlying concepts may change over the forthcoming years, as both the theoretical 
foundations as well as the implementation of DCMs are progressively refined.   
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1. Know what is "causal" about dynamic causal models. 
Causality in DCM is based on control theory (Friston, 2009): causal interactions among hidden 
state variables2 (e.g. specific aspects of neuronal population activity) are expressed by 
differential equations, which describe (i) how the present state of one neuronal population 
causes dynamics (i.e. rate of change) in another via synaptic connections, and (ii) how these 
interactions change under the influence of external perturbations (i.e., experimental 
manipulations) or endogenous brain activity.  The differential equations endow the system with 
memory such that future states are influenced by current states; the coupling parameters (rate 
constants) determine the speed of these influences.  The ensuing coupling is influenced by 
where and when the system is subject to external perturbations; i.e. sensory inputs driving 
activity in specific neuronal populations or modulatory inputs that render the strength of 
coupling context‐sensitive.  In other words, causality in DCM does not only rely on temporal 
precedence but also takes into account when and where the system is perturbed by external 
influences. 
An equivalent perspective is to interpret the state equation of a given DCM as encoding a 
particular causal structure‐function relationship (Stephan, 2004).  This is because the state 
equation of a given DCM prescribes explicitly how system dynamics arises from system 
structure: it specifies formally how neuronal state changes, induced by external inputs, 
propagate both in space (i.e. according to the system's connectivity structure) and in time (i.e. 
how current states influence future states).  Therefore, changing the pattern of external inputs 
or the connectivity structure in a given DCM leads to different predictions about the spatio‐
temporal pattern of measured system responses.  By simulating data from models with specified 
causal mechanisms, it is straightforward to assess whether, for a given level of observation 
noise, DCM is capable of correctly inferring these mechanisms.  This has been done using both 
the same neuronal equations as in DCM (e.g. (Stephan et al., 2008)) and using independently 
designed large‐scale biophysical models of spiking neurons (Lee et al., 2006).  Perhaps even 
more convincingly, several animal studies using independent techniques such as invasive 
                                                            
2 The term "hidden state variables" refers to time‐varying properties of systems that cannot be observed 
directly. 
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recordings and microdialysis demonstrated that DCM can successfully infer neuronal processes 
from BOLD responses and field potentials, respectively (David et al., 2008; Moran et al., 2008). 
Critically, the hidden neuronal states give rise to noisy observations through a forward mapping 
(e.g. neurovascular coupling in fMRI).  This transform is crucial for inferring causal interactions, 
particularly when it is nonlinear and may differ across brain regions, as is the case in fMRI (David 
et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2004).  Therefore, in contrast to Granger causality (Granger, 1969), 
causality in DCM does not describe interactions among the observations themselves.  Instead, 
DCM aims to infer interactions among hidden neuronal states that cause noisy observations 
through a (possibly nonlinear and spatially variable) mapping.   
It is noteworthy that inferring causal influences among neuronal populations does not 
necessarily require information about conduction delays.  While conduction delays are explicitly 
represented in (and estimated by) DCMs for electrophysiological data (c.f. (David et al., 2006)), 
axonal conduction delays in either inputs or inter‐regional influences do not play a role in DCMs 
for fMRI.  Due to considerable inter‐regional variability in hemodynamic response latencies, 
fMRI data do not posses enough temporal information to enable estimation of inter‐regional 
conduction delays, which are typically in the order of 10‐20 ms; for simulations investigating 
such timing issues see (Friston et al., 2003).  Instead, the differential latencies of the 
hemodynamic response are accommodated by region‐specific biophysical parameters in the 
hemodynamic model (Friston et al., 2000; Stephan et al., 2004).  Nevertheless, because it is not 
only sensitive to temporal order in signal but also to the spatio‐temporal structure of inputs to 
the system, fairly subtle processes can be identified with DCM.  For example, a recent rodent 
study showed that given fMRI data from a network of regions with epileptiform activity, DCM 
can infer where the seizure originated (David et al., 2008); this inference was verified by 
concurrent invasive electrophysiological recordings. 
In summary, causality in DCM is embodied by the mathematical form of the differential state 
equations and does not just reflect temporal precedence but also accounts for the effects of 
external perturbations.  By inverting an explicit forward model,3 DCM infers causal effects 
                                                            
3 A forward model describes how a specific hidden state translates into a measurement.  The "inversion" 
(fitting or solution) of a model describes the opposite process, i.e. to estimate the hidden state given the 
measurement. 
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among hidden neuronal states that give rise to noisy measurements through a mapping that can 
be nonlinear and variable across the brain. 
 
2. Know your hypothesis and how to test it. 
DCM was designed to test hypotheses about the neuronal mechanisms that underlie 
experimental measurements of brain responses.  In other words, DCM allows one to specify a 
generative model of measured brain data, which is a specific probabilistic mapping from 
experimentally controlled manipulations via neuronal dynamics to observed data. 
Importantly, two different types of inference can be obtained with DCM (Figure 1).  If one is not 
interested in any specific model parameter, but in some aspect of model structure per se, then 
inference on model space is required.  For example, one may wish to infer whether a particular 
neuronal system has a serial or parallel architecture, whether context‐sensitive modulation of 
connectivity concerns forward or backward connections or whether the modulatory mechanism 
is linear or nonlinear.  In other contexts, one may be interested in the neurophysiological 
mechanisms encoded by specific parameters in a given model; this requires inference on model 
parameters.  For example, in a given model one might want to infer whether a specific 
connection is more likely to exert an excitatory or an inhibitory effect on its target region.  Prior 
to conducting a DCM study, one should clarify the type of inference required for the question at 
hand.  This choice determines the sequences of data analysis steps as summarized in Figure 1.  
Issues pertaining to inference on model space and parameters, respectively, are dealt with in 
more detail below.   
In general, some scientific questions lend themselves more naturally to an analysis by DCM than 
others.  A key feature of DCM is its dependence on experimental perturbations.  Its state 
equations account for the influence of experimental manipulations on the system's dynamics: 
experimental conditions enter the model as inputs that either drive local responses or change 
connection strengths, respectively.4  For this reason, DCMs are only appropriate for explaining 
                                                            
4 For electrophysiological data, the driving inputs are parameterized themselves (e.g. in DCM for evoked 
responses; David et al. 2006) and can include stochastic inputs (e.g. white and pink noise in DCM for 
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brain responses that are the consequence of specific experimental interventions.  In contrast, 
data sets that were acquired in the absence of experimental control (e.g. resting state, sleep, 
hallucinations) are not suitable for DCM.  Note that, unless one introduces stochastic terms 
(Daunizeau et al., 2009a), current DCMs with no experimentally controlled input predict nothing 
but a flat line. This is because, by design, they are based on dynamical systems with fixed point 
attractors. This can be regarded as a prior on brain dynamics that precludes exponential 
explosions of neuronal activity.  It is conceivable, however, that in the future DCMs may be 
introduced that generate autonomous oscillations.  This means that any time series chosen for 
subsequent DCM should, as a minimal requirement, show some relation to the experimental 
design.  In fMRI, for example, this relation is usually established by an initial analysis using 
conventional statistical parametric mapping (SPM) on the basis of the general linear model 
(GLM).  In fact, as is elaborated in more detail in point 8 below, DCM is typically used to 
compare different mechanistic explanations for specific activations detected by SPM.  It is not 
unusual to ask questions about the interactions of areas with different response profiles; in this 
case, the areas included in a DCM are identified by different statistical contrasts in SPM.  A 
typical example is the analysis of stimulus‐by‐task interactions in an area identified with the 
appropriate contrast.  The response profile of such an area can be explained by task‐dependent 
modulation of (i) one or several afferent connections from other areas identified by testing for a 
main effect of stimulus or of (ii) its self‐connectivity (Allen et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2007a). 
Users of DCM (and other models of effective connectivity) sometimes worry that inference 
about the structure or parameters of a particular model may only be believable if the model as a 
whole shows a "reasonable" goodness of fit.  Strictly speaking, this is an anecdotal concern, as 
has been noted by previous authors: "Unfortunately, there seems to be a belief that the ability 
to make inferences about changes in effective connectivity is compromised if the overall model 
does not fit the data adequately." (Protzner and McIntosh, 2006)  These authors performed 
systematic simulation studies on the relation between model fit and inference about effective 
connectivity in the context of SEM and concluded that "... one can detect differences in effective 
connectivity with SEM even when the overall model does not fit the data".  Having said this, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
steady‐state responses; Moran et al. 2009) that represent neuronal background activity not included in 
the model.   
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usually the case that if the fits (accuracies) of competing models are poor, it is much more 
difficult to show that one model has greater evidence than another.  In other words, a large 
Bayes factor indicates that the models compared fit the data sufficiently well to enable 
meaningful model comparison.   
Some general points on the issue of model fit are worth highlighting here.  There are many 
reasons why a perfectly reasonable model may fit a particular data set poorly, for example 
independent observation noise.  On the other hand, it is easy to construct complex models with 
excellent or even perfect fit, which are mechanistically meaningless and do not generalise 
("overfitting").  This is why, as explained in section 3 below, Bayesian model selection is a 
mandatory component of any DCM study: before making inference about any particular 
parameter, the model with the best balance between accuracy and complexity is selected from 
the set of all plausible alternative models (see section 3).   Furthermore, frequentist decisions on 
whether a particular model fit is "sufficient" or not depend on the number of data points.  For 
example, the more data from the same process is available, the more likely it is that a 2χ  test 
will reject the null hypothesis of no difference between predicted and observed covariance 
matrices (Bullmore et al., 2000).  The opposite behaviour is found when evaluating model fit on 
the basis of the coefficient of determination ( 2R or "percent variance explained"): here, the 
longer the same process is observed, the more likely it is that any model will explain a significant 
amount of variance in the observed data.  In summary, while any inference is always conditional 
on the model chosen, the validity of the model cannot be evaluated on the basis of its fit; c.f. 
(Pitt and Myung, 2002). 
In contrast, establishing the validity of a given model requires additional external criteria.  For 
DCM, face validity has been explored in terms of simulations (e.g. (Friston et al., 2003; Stephan 
et al., 2008)), construct validity has been established in relation to other models such as SEM 
(Penny et al., 2004b) and large‐scale models of spiking neurons (Lee et al., 2006), and predictive 
validity has been addressed by verifying that DCM results fulfil predictions from independent 
experimental measures such as microdialysis (Moran et al., 2008) and invasive 
electrophysiological recordings (David et al., 2008).   
In conclusion, when making statistical inferences about any particular mechanism underlying the 
data (as encoded by a combination of model parameters), model fit does not need to be 
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considered explicitly; instead, it is an integral part of the model evidence that is optimised by 
BMS.  The influence of model fit on inference enters vicariously by determining the precision of 
the estimates; this effect depends on which model parameters the inference is about (c.f. 
standard equations for parameter estimates in a general linear model).  This issue is no different 
for DCM than for standard regression models.  In short, we cannot obtain false inference simply 
because of "poor" model fit. 
Although inference can be about any aspect of model structure or any parameter in a DCM, the 
focus of DCM studies is typically on context‐dependent changes in coupling.  This corresponds to 
identifying physiological processes that change connection strengths at fast time scales ranging 
from milliseconds to seconds.  DCM was developed for investigating these fast modulatory 
processes because they are critical for understanding the ubiquitous flexibility and context‐
sensitivity of neuronal circuits (Friston, 2002; McIntosh, 2000; Sherman and Guillery, 1998; 
Stephan, 2004).  If specifying the anatomical source of these modulatory processes is not 
relevant for the scientific question of interest, a bilinear DCM is sufficient (Friston et al., 2003).  
Otherwise nonlinear DCM can be used, in which the strength of any given connection is allowed 
to depend on activity in remote neuronal populations (Stephan et al., 2008).5 
To avoid erroneous interpretations of DCM results and accurately qualify the tested hypotheses, 
it is important to understand the neurophysiological mechanisms that underlie such fast 
modulatory processes.  In brief, rapid changes of connection strength can result either from 
membrane excitability changes, synaptic plasticity or a combination of both.  For example, 
postsynaptic responses of ionotropic glutamatergic receptors are modulated by metabotropic 
receptors (Coutinho and Knopfel, 2002) and by receptors of various neuromodulatory 
transmitters (McCormick and Williamson, 1989).  Alternatively, various forms of short‐term 
synaptic plasticity can lead to fast changes in synaptic strength; e.g. synaptic depression and 
facilitation (Zucker and Regehr, 2002), NMDA‐ and dopamine‐dependent phosphorylation of 
AMPA receptors (Chao et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2005), or dendritic spine motility (Holtmaat and 
                                                            
5 In bilinear DCM, the modulation of effective connectivity results from an interaction between neuronal 
activity in one region and experimentally controlled inputs; this context‐dependent change in connectivity 
is additive.  In contrast, in nonlinear DCM, changes in connectivity result from the interaction of neuronal 
activity in two different regions; this modulation is of a multiplicative nature. 
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Svoboda, 2009).  All of these changes in synaptic strength can unfold within milliseconds to 
seconds. 
In most instances it is not important for the scientific question of interest to disambiguate 
whether modulatory processes identified with DCM reflect, at the neuronal level, changes in 
membrane excitability or synaptic plasticity.  In fact, the two processes are often closely 
intertwined (Oh et al., 2009).  If it is important to evaluate their relative contributions, it is 
necessary to adjust model structure and experimental design prospectively, using models that 
can represent both processes separately (Moran et al., 2008) or using experimental 
manipulations that are known to preferentially affect one of the two processes.  An in‐depth 
discussion of model‐based inference about neuronal (patho)physiology with DCM is beyond the 
scope of the present article but is presented elsewhere (Stephan et al.,  in preparation).  
In summary, DCM tests competing hypotheses about the neuronal mechanisms underlying 
experimental measurements of brain activity.  Inference about putative mechanisms can either 
concern model structure or estimates of model parameters.  DCMs are most appropriate for 
explaining brain responses that are the consequence of experimental interventions and typically 
focus on context‐dependent changes in coupling that are mediated by fast changes in 
membrane excitability and/or connection strength.  DCM is therefore a potentially useful 
approach for studying neuromodulation and synaptic plasticity, respectively, particularly when 
invasive methods are precluded for practical or ethical reasons. 
 
3. Use Bayesian model selection as a first step. 
As described above, DCM can rely on two different types of inference, inference on model space 
and inference on parameter space of any given model, respectively.  Here, we emphasise that 
even when one is interested in inference on model parameters, a first step is usually Bayesian 
model selection (BMS).  BMS is an established procedure in statistics that rests on computing 
(an approximation to) the model evidence p(y|m), i.e. the probability of the data y, given some 
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model m.6  The model evidence, which can be considered the “holy grail” of model comparison, 
quantifies the properties of a good model; i.e. that it explains the data as accurately as possible 
and, at the same time, has minimal complexity.  Mathematical explanations of these properties 
can be found elsewhere (Friston et al., 2007; MacKay, 1992; Penny et al., 2004a; Stephan et al., 
2009a).  In BMS, models are usually compared via their Bayes factor, i.e. the ratio of their 
respective evidences (Kass and Raftery, 1995) or, equivalently, their difference in log‐evidence 
(relative log‐evidence). 
Importantly, the model evidence is also a measure of generalisability (Pitt and Myung, 2002), i.e. 
how well the model generalizes across different data sets, and can thus be seen as an equivalent 
(but computationally more efficient) approach to procedures like cross‐validation (MacKay, 
1992).  This may be easier to understand by noting that the model evidence is the likelihood of 
the data, having taken into account the natural variability of model parameters or, more 
formally, the prediction of data under random sampling from the prior densities of its 
parameters. 
For inference on model space, BMS is sufficient, but it can be applied in different ways (Figure 
1).  In brief, one can either identify a single optimal model, or one can choose a model space 
partitioning approach and compare sets or families of models that differ in one or several 
structural aspects (Penny et al., 2009a; Stephan et al., 2009a).  Different options for using BMS, 
in the context of DCM, will be discussed in more detail below.   
When inferring on model parameters, one needs to evaluate their estimated posterior densities.  
Critically, however, these posterior densities are conditional on the particular model chosen.  
For this reason, BMS is usually a requirement even when the hypothesis concerns values of 
model parameters and not model structure per se.7  Usually, one defines all plausible models in 
a first step, then uses BMS to select an optimal model from all alternatives and finally proceeds 
                                                            
6 For numerical reasons, it is often more convenient to use the log‐evidence as an index of model 
goodness.  This is equivalent because the logarithm is a strictly monotonic function, i.e. maximising the 
log‐evidence also maximises the evidence. 
7 In some (albeit rare) instances one may have very strong a priori knowledge about the structure of the 
system of interest and can proceed directly to inference on parameters. 
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to reporting posterior or conditional inferences about the parameters of this optimal model.  
This approach has been used by numerous studies in the recent past (e.g. (Acs and Greenlee, 
2008; Leff et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2007b; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008)).  For single 
subject analyses, inference about any particular parameter (or about linear combinations of 
parameters) is straightforward; one can simply evaluate the posterior density of the parameter 
of interest, quantifying the probability that the value of the parameter is larger or smaller than 
some threshold (Friston et al., 2003).  For multi‐subject analyses, two options exist depending 
on whether one assumes that the parameters of interest are fixed effects in the population (FFX) 
or are themselves probabilistically distributed in the population (random effects, RFX).  These 
issues are discussed in more depth in section 7. 
In summary, model selection is an essential component of any DCM study and is not normally 
omitted unless there is extremely strong a priori knowledge about the model.  An important 
distinction is whether the hypothesis of interest concerns model structure per se or estimates of 
particular parameters in an optimal model.  In the former case, BMS alone is sufficient to 
address the hypothesis, whereas in the latter case, a hierarchical or sequential procedure is 
necessary, where inference about particular parameters follows an initial model selection 
procedure.    
 
4. Motivate model space carefully. 
For any experimental observation, there exists, in principle, an infinite number of possible 
models that could explain the data.  At first glance, this may appear a daunting state of affairs: 
how can one ever discover the “true” model, given an infinity of alternatives?  It is helpful to 
remember that models are never true; by construction they are meant to be helpful caricatures 
of complex phenomena, such that mechanisms underlying these phenomena can be tested.  
This insight is reflected in the well‐known statement by (Box and Draper, 1987): “Essentially, all 
models are wrong, but some are useful” (p. 424).  The purpose of model selection is to 
determine that model, from a set of plausible alternatives, which is most useful; i.e. represents 
the best balance between accuracy and complexity and thus affords maximal generalisability 
(Pitt and Myung, 2002).   
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The critical question in practice is how many plausible model alternatives exist; in other words, 
how large is the model space that must be searched?  For small systems (i.e., networks or 
graphs with a small number of nodes) it is possible to investigate all possible connectivity 
architectures.  However, when increasing the number of regions and inputs, evaluating all 
possible models becomes practically impossible very rapidly.  Therefore, one of the first 
decisions, when conducting a DCM analysis, is to define the relevant model space; i.e. the set of 
models that are plausible, given prior knowledge about the system.  This definition of the 
relevant model space should be as transparent and systematic as possible, and it should be 
described clearly in any paper.   
To ensure a clear definition and systematic exploration of model space, it is helpful to specify 
the important dimensions in model space and construct variations of models along these 
dimensions systematically.  The definition of this space of plausible models could derive from 
principled considerations (e.g. combinatorial variations of a basic model structure) or could be 
informed by previous empirical studies using neuroimaging, electrophysiology, TMS, etc. in 
humans or animals.  One option is to parameterize model space itself, where these parameters 
define a grid from which models can be sampled systematically.  For example, models can be 
defined in terms of their priors, which could be a mathematical function of anatomical 
connectivity (e.g. tractography measures). Systematically varying the parameters of this function 
creates a model space; c.f. (Stephan et al., 2009b).  Another approach is to create, under 
appropriate constraints, all possible combinations of components; for example all possible 
combinations of modulatory inputs and/or driving inputs (for examples, see (Kumar et al., 2007; 
Leff et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2007b)).  A final option is to structure model space in a factorial 
fashion (Chen et al., 2009; Daunizeau et al., 2009b; Stephan et al., 2007c).  The advantage of this 
approach is that it suggests a natural partitioning of model space into equally large subsets or 
families of models, which, as described below, can be compared collectively. 
It may be useful to note at this stage that the definition of model space may or may not include 
variations concerning the regions contained by the model, depending on whether such 
variations change the data that are to be explained.  In brief, for EEG/MEG data, model 
comparison can be used to decide about the number of regions, whereas for fMRI data it cannot 
(see point 6 for details). 
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In summary, defining the dimensions of model space carefully is an important initial step in any 
DCM study.  It prevents the modeller from getting lost in a space of infinite possibilities; it 
operationalises the thinking about what constitutes plausible alternatives; and it is the basis for 
model space partitioning. This allows for powerful inferences about model structure, as 
described in the next section.   
  
5. Choose an appropriate method for group-level inference on 
model structure. 
Several options exist for performing BMS at the group level.  As for all group analyses, a choice 
must be made between fixed effects (FFX) and random effects (RFX) analysis.  In the FFX case, 
one assumes that the optimal model is the same for each subject in the population.  This 
assumption is warranted when studying a basic physiological mechanism that is unlikely to vary 
across the subjects sampled.  For example, FFX approaches to group‐level BMS have been used 
to investigate the relation between anatomical connection probability and strength of functional 
coupling (Stephan et al., 2009b) and asymmetries between forward and backward connections 
in the visual system (Chen et al., 2009).  Under the FFX assumption, a useful metric is the group 
Bayes factor (GBF; (Stephan et al., 2007c)), which expresses the evidence for one model relative 
to the evidence for another model, considering the group as a whole.  The GBF has a simple 
definition: because Bayes factors are probability ratios, which are independent across subjects, 
the GBF is the product of individual Bayes factors.  When comparing more than two models, it is 
more straightforward to report the group log‐evidence for each model, which is just the sum of 
log‐evidences across subjects.  In practice, the simplest and most informative way to report the 
(group) log‐evidence is to show a bar chart of log‐evidences over models, after subtracting the 
log‐evidence for the model with the least evidence (e.g. (Garrido et al., 2009; Stephan et al., 
2009b)).  Readers can then tell at a glance which model(s) had the greatest evidence and 
whether the differences were quantitatively important.  Usually, a difference in log‐evidence of 
three is take an as strong evidence (Kass and Raftery, 1995) because the corresponding Bayes 
factor of exp(3) is about twenty (c.f. the p<0.05 criterion often employed in classical inference). 
However, assuming that the optimal model structure is a fixed effect in the population may not 
be appropriate.  For example, when investigating pathophysiological mechanisms in a spectrum 
disease or when dealing with cognitive tasks that can be performed with various cognitive 
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strategies (and thus implemented neuronally in different ways), it is more appropriate to adopt 
a random effects (RFX) BMS procedure.  An early suggestion for a simple RFX index was the 
positive evidence ratio (PER; (Stephan et al., 2007c)).  This is simply the ratio of how many 
subjects showed positive evidence8 for one model relative to another.  The PER can be 
considered a special case of a general and fully probabilistic RFX procedure for BMS.  This 
generalised method uses variational Bayes (VB) to estimate the posterior probabilities of 
competing models, given data from a population of subjects (Stephan et al., 2009a).  Based on 
this, one can compute how likely it is that a specific model generated the data of a randomly 
chosen subject (i.e. the expected posterior model probability) as well as the exceedance 
probability that one model is more likely than any other model, given the group data.  
Evaluations based on synthetic and empirical data have shown that this method is accurate and 
robust; in contrast to FFX analyses, outliers have very little impact on the results (Stephan et al., 
2009a).  With the availability of this method in SPM8, the use of the PER should be abandoned.   
In addition to comparing specific models one can also compare subsets (families) of models, 
which result from a partition of model space.  For example, BMS can be used to quantify the 
probability that the presence versus the absence of a particular connection improves model 
performance, regardless of any other differences among the models considered.  This type of 
inference rests on comparing two (or more) subsets of model space, pooling information over 
models in each subset.  This effectively removes uncertainty about any aspect of model 
structure, other than the attribute of interest (which defines the partition of model space).  This 
approach currently represents the method of choice when the hypothesis to be tested concerns 
model structure and not any specific parameter.  This sort of inference is available for both fixed 
and random effects group models (Penny et al., 2009a; Stephan et al., 2009a).9,10 
                                                            
8 Following the widely used classification by Kass & Raftery (1995), "positive" evidence for one model 
versus another exists if the Bayes factor is larger than three. 
9 At the time of writing this paper, family‐level inference based on model space partitioning is not yet 
available via the graphical user interface in SPM8.  Instead, users can implement it by directly calling the 
SPM routine spm_compare_families. 
10  The VB implementation of the random effects BMS method is only applicable when the model families 
contain an equal numbers of models.  When comparing model families of unequal size, a Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain (MCMC) method based on Gibbs sampling must be used instead (Penny et al. 2009a). 
Ten simple rules for DCM.  NeuroImage, in press. 18
In summary, FFX BMS assumes that the optimal model is identical across the population and 
uses the GBF or group log‐evidence to quantify the relative goodness of models.  In contrast, 
RFX BMS accounts for heterogeneity of model structure across subjects and yields posterior 
model probabilities and exceedance probabilities.  In either case, model space partitioning and 
subsequent comparison of model families (family‐level inference) should be considered when 
the hypothesis of interest concerns model structure and not any particular model parameter. 
 
6. Know what you can and cannot do with Bayesian model 
selection. 
BMS based on (approximations to) the log‐evidence is a principled and computationally efficient 
method for determining an optimal model from a set of competing alternatives, given some 
data.11  For example, one can compare DCMs that differ in terms of which inputs affect the 
system, where these inputs enter, whether mechanisms are linear or nonlinear, which 
anatomical connections exist or which priors are best (Acs and Greenlee, 2008; Chen et al., 
2009; Garrido et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2009b; Stephan et al., 2007c).  In 
other neuroimaging domains, BMS is not just being used for DCMs but is also routinely 
employed to decide between alternative source reconstructions procedures for EEG/MEG data 
(e.g. (Friston et al., 2008; Henson et al., 2009; Kiebel et al., 2008)).  BMS has also been 
frequently used in machine learning (Chu et al., 2006; MacKay, 1992; Penny and Roberts, 1999) 
and neuroeconomics, for example, to distinguish between competing models of learning and 
decision making (Brodersen et al., 2008; den Ouden et al., 2009b; Hampton et al., 2006).  There 
are, however, some caveats in using BMS and interpreting its results in the context of DCM that 
a user should be aware of. 
A mathematically trivial but practically important issue is that the model evidence is defined 
with respect to one particular data set.  This means that BMS cannot be applied to models that 
are fitted to different data.  Specifically, in DCM for fMRI, one cannot compare models with 
                                                            
11 Computational efficiency of model selection procedures is becoming an increasingly important issue 
since the model space that is explored by standard neuroimaging studies is continually increasing.  For 
large model sets comprising hundreds or thousands of models, alternative procedures based on sampling, 
e.g. cross‐validation, become prohibitively expensive: c.f. MacKay 1992. 
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different numbers of regions, because changing the regions changes the data (this is an artefact 
of the data reduction used in DCM for fMRI, in which only data from regions of interest are 
included).  In the case of DCM for MEG/EEG, however, the data to which the model is fitted (i.e. 
the spatio‐temporal distribution of electric potentials or magnetic fields at the sensor level) is 
always the same, regardless of how many regions (sources) are included in the model.  In fact, 
DCM can be considered a source reconstruction approach that exploits information about 
coupling amongst sources and can be used to determine the most likely number and 
deployment of sources (Kiebel et al., 2006).   
A more complicated issue, which frequently occurs in exchanges with reviewers, is that any 
measure of model goodness is relative, not absolute.  This is true for any approximation to the 
model evidence (e.g. the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, or free‐energy) and the 
ensuing Bayes factor. It also applies to log‐odds ratios and other frequentist statistics like the 
classical coefficient of determination ( 2R ) which, in the context of linear models, is often 
interpreted as the proportion of variance explained by the model.  Although 2R  may appear, at 
first glance, like an absolute goodness of fit index, it is simply the result of a model comparison.  
Mathematically, this can be seen easily from the generalized definition of 2R  (e.g. (Nagelkerke, 
1991)), which reveals that 2R  is always determined relative to an (implicit) null model.  For 
example, in the context of linear models, this null model is extremely simple, consisting of a 
constant (or intercept) only.   See section 2 for a discussion on why measures such as 2R  are 
not useful for evaluating DCMs.  
The relative nature of inference obtained by BMS also pertains to the RFX BMS procedure 
described above: here, the posterior model probabilities are a function of the set of models 
considered.  In other words, these estimates can change when reducing or extending model 
space.  Although mathematically this behaviour is perfectly reasonable (for details, see (Stephan 
et al., 2009a)), it can produce seemingly counterintuitive results, when sequentially performing 
BMS on parts of model space that have a nested or overlapping relationship (Penny et al., 
2009a).  To prevent problems of interpretation, such sequential tests should be avoided; 
instead, one should perform BMS on the entire space of plausible alternative models in one 
step.   
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In summary, it is important to keep in mind that any result obtained by BMS, or indeed any 
other model selection procedure, expresses a relative statement about model goodness that is 
conditional on the model space considered.  Again, this highlights the importance of a careful 
and principled definition of model space (c.f. section 4). 
  
7. Choose an appropriate method for group-level inference on 
parameters. 
When analysing parameter estimates across the group, the same decision must be made as for 
group‐level BMS (see section 4).  That is, the modeller needs to decide whether the mechanisms 
encoded by the model parameters of interest are likely to exist as fixed or random effects in the 
population.  If they can be considered fixed effects, e.g. when dealing with low‐level 
physiological properties, several alternative procedures exist.  One commonly employed method 
is Bayesian parameter averaging (BPA).  This effectively computes a joint posterior density for 
the entire group by combining the individual posterior densities, treating the posterior from one 
subject as the prior for the next (Garrido et al., 2007; Neumann and Lohmann, 2003).  The 
mathematical advantage of this commutative procedure is threefold.  First, it accounts for 
posterior covariances amongst the parameters; secondly, under Gaussian assumptions about 
the posterior, it is extremely easy and efficient to compute; and finally, it produces a single 
posterior density for the entire group that can be used for Bayesian inference (c.f. (Acs and 
Greenlee, 2008)).  However, BPA also has some disadvantages (Kasess et al., 2009).  One 
potential problem is that the posterior covariances can make the posterior estimates behave in 
a counterintuitive way, even when they are mathematically perfectly sensible.  This can become 
particularly severe for data with a high signal‐to‐noise ratio where, in the presence of 
pronounced posterior covariances, the Bayesian average can deviate substantially from the 
mean of the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates across subjects.  Other fixed effects 
methods do not suffer from this particular problem, although they have other restrictions; for 
details see (Kasess et al., 2009).  These alternatives include the univariate variant of BPA and 
simple temporal averaging of the subjects' time series as a pre‐processing step (which is only 
possible if the stimulus timing is identical across subjects).   
If a fixed effects analysis is not appropriate and one thinks that the parameters are random 
effects in the population (e.g. task‐induced changes in connection strengths in cognitive 
 21
paradigms), a simple solution exists.  This approach consists of entering the subject‐specific MAP 
estimates into a second‐level frequentist test (e.g. a t‐test or ANOVA).  This procedure is simple 
and robust and has found widespread application. It is conceptually identical to the summary 
statistic approach used in conventional SPM analyses, only here the summary statistic is a 
maximum a posteriori estimate (as opposed to a maximum likelihood estimate). 
An alternative approach is Bayesian model averaging (BMA) (Hoeting et al., 1999; Penny et al., 
2009a).12  This approach abandons the dependence of parameter inference on the particular 
model chosen.  Instead, it uses the entire model space considered (or an optimal family of 
models; (Penny et al., 2009a)) and computes weighted averages of each model parameter, 
where the weighting is given by the posterior probability for each model.  It represents a useful 
alternative, particularly when none of the models (or model subspaces) considered clearly 
outperforms all others.  In this case, one can take the uncertainty about model structure into 
account by pooling information across all models in a weighted fashion, as described above.  
BMA is also a promising method for comparing parameter estimates across groups (e.g. patients 
versus controls) for cases where BMS indicated a group difference with regard to the optimal 
model.  If one does not wish to restrict the group comparison to inference on model structure, 
one can use BMA to compute the average parameter estimates across all models and then 
statistically compare these averages between the two groups.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that testing hypotheses about multiple parameters requires a 
correction for multiple comparisons (unless a single contrast, i.e. linear combination of these 
parameters, is examined).  A Bonferroni procedure would be the simplest way to do this, even 
though this is conservative in the presence of posterior dependencies amongst the parameters 
tested. 
In summary, there are two principled approaches to making group‐level inferences about 
specific model parameters (Figure 1).  The first approach entails finding an optimal model in an 
initial BMS step and then examining the parameter estimates across the group, using either FFX 
or RFX methods.  A second possible approach is BMA which computes a weighted average of 
                                                            
12 This approach can be used both for single subjects and for groups; see Penny et al. (2009a). An 
implementation of this procedure will be available in forthcoming SPM versions. 
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each model parameter, where the weighting is determined by the posterior probability of each 
model. 
 
8. Optimise experimental design and data acquisition. 
A frequently asked question is what experimental designs and acquisition techniques are 
optimal for DCM analyses.  The answer may differ somewhat for hemodynamic and 
electrophysiological measurements.  As a rule of thumb, however, the same optimisation 
strategies for design and data acquisition which apply to conventional generative models of 
brain activity (e.g. the General Linear Model) also apply to DCM.  This is because DCM aims to 
explain the same phenomena, i.e. regional brain responses, as other generative models, and is 
thus subject to similar constraints concerning experimental design and data acquisition.  The 
critical difference lies in the mechanisms the models have at their disposal to explain observed 
data.  DCM not only takes into account the direct influence of experimentally controlled 
variables on regional activity (as the GLM), but considers interactions amongst neuronal 
populations and how these interactions are modulated by experimental perturbations.  DCM is 
thus a very generic model and includes other generative models of brain responses as special 
cases.  For example, the GLM for fMRI data and source reconstruction methods for EEG/MEG 
can be thought as special cases of DCMs (for details, see (Daunizeau et al., 2009b; Kiebel et al., 
2006; Stephan et al., 2007a)).  Similarly, conventional models of effective connectivity, such as 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM; (Bullmore et al., 2000; Horwitz et al., 1999; McIntosh and 
Gonzalez‐Lima, 1994)) can be understood as a special case of DCM where states are assumed to 
have reached equilibrium at the point of observation (Friston et al., 2003). 
In terms of experimental design, DCM is especially useful for factorial designs whose levels can 
be interpreted as inducing driving effects (such as sensory stimulation) and modulatory effects 
(such as learning or attention), respectively.  Factorial designs are particularly attractive because 
they naturally embody the notion of interactions among experimental manipulations and thus 
context‐sensitive neuronal responses, which are the typical explanatory target of a DCM study 
(see section 2).  For example, if a conventional SPM analysis indicates a significant interaction 
between one experimental factor related to sensory stimulation and another factor of a more 
"modulatory" character (e.g. task demands, attention or learning), one may wish to understand 
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how this interaction or context‐sensitive response arises.  This can be modelled 
straightforwardly using DCM with connections that convey stimulus‐specific information, which 
are under the control of modulatory influences.  With DCM and BMS one could investigate, for 
example, which of the many afferents to the target area are subject to modulatory inputs, and 
whether a specific neuronal population constitutes a likely anatomical source of these 
modulatory inputs (this requires nonlinear DCM; (Stephan et al., 2008)).  Examples of this can be 
found in several papers (e.g. (Heim et al., 2009; Stephan et al., 2007a)).  Another attractive 
option for experimental design is to focus on processes which (i) are known to induce synaptic 
plasticity, and thus changes in effective connectivity, and (ii) have a known (or assumed) 
parametric form.  A prototypical example fulfilling both criteria is learning.  Here, DCM and BMS 
can be used to investigate which of several competing learning models best explain changes in 
connection strength in neuronal circuits involved in learning, and which particular connections 
exhibit synaptic plasticity and thus contribute to learning (for examples, see (den Ouden et al., 
2009a; den Ouden et al., 2009b)). 
Concerning data acquisition, two issues are worth highlighting in relation to DCM for fMRI.  Due 
to the multi‐slice acquisition of fMRI data, regional time series are sampled at different times 
relative to scan onset, and these timing differences represent a potential confound.  Simulations 
indicated that timing differences up to about a second were tolerable and did not lead to 
significant deviations of parameter estimates from their true values (because these inaccuracies 
could be explained away by the hemodynamic model;  (Friston et al., 2003).  As a consequence, 
a common recommendation used to be to restrict TA (time to acquisition)13 to two seconds or 
less and use the middle slice (in time) as reference for defining the inputs.  This limitation was 
overcome by extending DCM for fMRI with a model of slice‐specific sampling times (Kiebel et al., 
2007).  This extended model accounts for the times at which regional sampled were sampled 
and adjusts its predicted hemodynamic output accordingly.14   
                                                            
13 This is the time required to obtain one brain volume. 
14 TA is usually equivalent to TR (time to repetition) unless the fMRI acquisition sequence includes a delay 
between subsequent scans, e.g. in sparse sampling schemes for auditory tasks.  The duration of TR has no 
impact on DCM, and sparsely sampled fMRI data pose no difficulty for DCM analyses; c.f. Kumar et al. 
(2007).   
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A second important issue in relation to data acquisition in fMRI concerns the order of acquired 
slices.  For DCM, and other models of effective connectivity, a continuous acquisition scheme 
(with appropriate inter‐slice gap) is advantageous, when compared to interleaved acquisition.  
In the latter scheme, any interpolation across neighbouring slices (e.g., during realignment or 
spatial normalization) or extraction of representative time series from voxels across more than 
one slice, leads to the mixing of time series that were acquired together.  This is suboptimal and 
should be avoided. 
Concerning the application of DCM to EEG/MEG data, it is worth mentioning that the only strict 
requirement is to record the electrode positions on the scalp, as well as the usual positioning 
landmarks (left ear, right ear and nasion fiducials). These are required to model the spatial 
expression of neuronal activity as measured electromagnetic fields at the scalp level.  Although 
it is possible, in principle, to invert a DCM given data from a single electrode, model inversion is 
facilitated by a fine spatial sampling on the scalp.  
Beyond data acquisition, it is important to decide which aspects of the data are of interest, i.e. 
feature selection.  For example, in fMRI tens of thousands of voxel time series are acquired, 
resulting in a huge spatio‐temporal data matrix.  To reduce complexity and allow for meaningful 
inference, DCM for fMRI requires that one summarises the distributed responses observed 
across the brain by selecting a few key regions involved in the process of interest.  In defining 
these regions one is implicitly specifying a structural model, which represents a data reduction 
or feature selection.  From another perspective this structural model is a parsimonious 
representation of other possible models, e.g. models with additional intermediate or relay 
regions.  To reduce complexity, it is often possible to analyse a sub‐network of key regions 
involved in a particular task.  This is particularly straightforward when dealing with sensory 
"processing streams" where relay regions can be omitted  (c.f. (Grol et al., 2007)) because the 
coupling parameters represent the effective connectivity among regions, and this influence can 
be mediated polysynaptically (Friston, 1994).  Also, one can replace endogenous inputs from a 
sub‐network one is not interested in with exogenous (driving) inputs that approximate the 
influence from this sub‐network.  For example, one can replace both sensory and cognitive sub‐
networks with inputs representing the sensory stimuli (Heim et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2006)) and 
the cognitive process (den Ouden et al., 2009b; Stephan et al., 2008), respectively (in the latter 
case, a cognitive factor provides driving input to at least one region).  In a next step it is then 
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possible to optimise this substitute for the omitted sub‐network by comparing different spatial 
distribution of the exogenous inputs using BMS; c.f. (Leff et al., 2008).  Given these possibilities 
for reduction of model complexity, it is perhaps not surprising that some of the most powerful 
applications of DCM have used networks with as few as two or three nodes.  Note that, as 
explained in section 6, in DCM for fMRI (but not in DCMs for electrophysiological data) BMS 
cannot be used to decide whether a region should be included or excluded because the model 
evidence is defined with regard to a specific data set, and changing the regions changes the 
data. 
In DCM for fMRI, once the regions have been selected it is necessary to obtain a summary of 
their activity.  For fMRI, this is usually accessed through the principal eigenvariate of the region 
of interest.  This is just the first principal component of the local multivariate time‐series (over 
all voxels in the region).  This procedure has advantages over other summary indices like the 
mean.  For example, when dealing with functionally heterogeneous regions it guarantees that 
positive and negative responses do not cancel in extracting a summary time‐series across voxels 
(Friston et al., 2006).  In group studies, one wants to ensure that the same regional features are 
selected from subject to subject. The best way to do this is to operationally define the region in 
each subject by functional and anatomical criteria (see section 9) and then use the principal 
eigenvariate centred on each subject‐specific region.  This regional definition is usually based on 
the functional specialisation revealed by a conventional SPM analysis (i.e., a maximum of an 
SPM testing for that region’s responses).   
Note that there is no circularity in using the same data to define regions by SPM and analyse 
their interactions with DCM.  This is because, in contrast to SPM, the purpose of DCM is not to 
test whether any of these regions shows an experimental effect.  Instead, as explained above, 
DCM serves to compare different hypotheses about the mechanisms (in terms of neuronal 
coupling) that underlie the regional responses detected in conventional analyses.  For example, 
if SPM indicates that an experimental manipulation significantly increases the activity of a 
particular region, there are numerous possible explanations, which can be disambiguated by 
DCM.  The observed increase in activity might (i) reflect the downstream consequence of a 
context‐sensitive process elsewhere in the network that is conveyed via endogenous 
connections in a context‐independent manner, (ii) result from changes in intra‐regional 
inhibition (i.e. a modulation of the self‐connection by the experimental factor), or (iii) arise from 
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a modulation of one or several afferent connections by the experimental factor.  Indeed, it 
would be nonsensical to ask this question of regional responses that did not show experimental 
effects.  Generally, one should use the most revealing t‐ or F‐contrast for each region, to identify 
the local maxima in subject‐specific SPMs that are nearest to the maximum in the group SPM.  
One can then take the principal eigenvariate in a local region of interest that is centred on the 
subject‐specific maxima and is ideally informed by additional anatomical criteria (c.f. section 9).  
Future refinements of this procedure include augmenting DCMs with an explicit spatial model of 
regional responses (Woolrich et al., 2009).  Alternative approaches can be based on 
anatomically defined regions of interest; where the shape and form of the region depends on 
the spatial precision of the data.  Irrespective of the method for summarising regional activity, it 
should be described and motivated clearly and simply (c.f. section 10). 
 
9. Use anatomical information and computational models to refine 
your DCMs. 
Both knowledge about anatomical structure and computational processes of the system of 
interest can help to optimize a DCM of that system.  For example, neuroanatomical atlases can 
provide useful constraints for defining the regions included in a DCM.  This is particularly 
relevant for multi‐subject‐studies, which face the challenge of inter‐individual variations in the 
exact location of a given brain area.  Here, probabilistic cytoarchitectonic atlases, such as the 
anatomy toolbox in SPM (Eickhoff et al., 2005), can provide anatomical constraints that 
complement functional criteria (see section 8) in choosing regional time series; for concrete 
examples, see (Heim et al., 2009) and (Stephan et al., 2007b). 
The second useful source of anatomical information concerns the anatomical connectivity 
between regions of interest.  Many previous studies of effective connectivity have used 
information from invasive tract tracing studies in the Macaque monkey to inform the structure 
of their models.  These data are of high resolution and large quantity but entail potential inter‐
species differences.  Human tractography studies, based on diffusion weighted imaging, do not 
suffer from this problem, but provide less detailed and non‐directional information.  
Nevertheless, they can provide important structural constraints for defining DCMs.  For 
example,  anatomical connectivity information from probabilistic tractography studies can be 
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formally integrated into DCMs in terms of anatomically informed priors (Stephan et al., 2009b).  
This approach rests on the fact that the deployment of anatomical connections constrains 
effective connectivity, but does not fully determine it; because synaptic connections can be 
expressed functionally in a dynamic and context‐sensitive fashion (Breakspear, 2004; Friston, 
2002; McIntosh, 2000; Stephan et al., 2008).  A useful corollary is to define connection‐specific 
priors such that the higher the likelihood of a given connection existing anatomically, the larger 
the prior variance of the corresponding coupling parameter in DCM; hence making it easier for 
the parameter to deviate from zero (in either direction) and represent a strong effective 
connection.  Incorporating anatomical information in this way can improve the evidence of 
DCMs (Stephan et al., 2009b).  Therefore, when available, DCMs can be informed by 
tractography data; the benefit of such anatomical constraints can then be assessed using BMS.   
Prior knowledge about the nature of the computations involved in an experimentally induced 
cognitive process can also help to refine DCMs.  For example, if an established computational 
model exists that predicts the temporal evolution of some cognitive variables, then any trial‐by‐
trial values can enter a DCM, either as driving or as modulatory inputs that change connection 
strengths (Stephan, 2004).  This is an attractive option, in the context of learning, since this is 
the paradigmatic experimental manipulation to induce synaptic plasticity and therefore changes 
in effective connectivity.  For example, several theories of learning agree on the notion that 
synaptic plasticity should be a function of prediction error (Friston, 2005; Montague et al., 1996; 
Schultz and Dickinson, 2000).  This notion can be tested by augmenting DCMs with 
computational learning models (such as Rescorla‐Wagner, temporal difference learning or 
Bayesian learning models), which describe the evolution of trial‐by‐trial prediction errors.  These 
trial‐wise prediction error estimates can be used as modulatory inputs in DCM, controlling 
changes in connection strength during learning (den Ouden et al., 2009a).  In a further step of 
refinement, nonlinear DCM can be used to specify the source of these modulatory influences 
anatomically.  For example, a study of audio‐visual associative learning showed that prediction 
error activity in the putamen, as modelled by a Bayesian learner, exerted a nonlinear 
modulatory influence on visuomotor connections, thus gating transfer of sensory information 
about unexpected stimuli (den Ouden et al., 2009b).   
In summary, whenever available, a priori information about anatomy and computation should 
be used for refining DCMs.  When anatomical or computational quantities are used as described 
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above, one is effectively performing a form of multimodal integration that uses functional, 
anatomical as well as behavioural data.  This confluence of computational and 
neurophysiological modelling techniques may prove particularly fruitful for a mechanistic 
understanding of neuronal systems.   
 
10. Report the modelling approach and results in detail. 
Although the principles of DCM are generic, understanding the structure of a specific model (or 
model space) built by someone else can be difficult, unless it is communicated very clearly.  
When reporting the results of the DCM study, it is helpful to include as many organising details 
as possible; e.g., describe your thinking behind the construction of model space, and why you 
included some attributes and not others.  It is these choices that define the question you wish to 
address.  This will help others to understand exactly what you have done and to replicate your 
results.  The information that is required concerns all stages of the modelling process.  For 
example, one should report 
- the anatomical and/or functional criteria used to define regions of interest and their 
summary time series, 
- the resulting coordinates of regions and their consistency across subjects, 
- how model space was motivated by the hypothesis, 
- how families of models were defined, when using model space partitioning, 
- the BMS procedure and  approximation to the log‐evidence used, 
- BMS results for all models considered (e.g. by tabulating or plotting log‐evidences, posterior 
probabilities or exceedance probabilities for each model), 
- the parameters of the selected model (or family), this may be just the MAP estimates or 
inference using the classical summary statistic approach or BPA. 
Of course, it is not always necessary (or desirable) to include all of this information in the main 
text of an article; some of the information above can be included in the supplementary material 
or summarised in graphs and tables.   
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Summary 
DCM is a generic and powerful method for inferring causal mechanisms in systems, whose 
dynamics are observed indirectly.  Following considerable success in its application to many 
domains of cognitive neuroscience and neurophysiology, the use of DCM is becoming 
increasingly widespread.  However, given that DCM is a nontrivial technique for nonlinear 
system identification that does not afford "off the shelf" applications, knowledge of its 
conceptual and mathematical foundations is mandatory.  This article has outlined procedures 
for good practice, focusing on what we perceive as the most relevant and generic issues.  
Clearly, there are more methodological aspects to DCM than can be addressed in a tutorial 
paper, and the interested reader is referred to the primary literature we have referenced.  We 
hope that the ten simple rules described above will be helpful for the growing community of 
DCM users. 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1:  This schematic summarizes the typical sequence of analysis in DCM, depending on the 
question of interest.  Abbreviations:  FFX = fixed effects, RFX = random effects, BMS = Bayesian 
model selection, BPA = Bayesian parameter averaging, BMA = Bayesian model averaging, 
ANOVA = analysis of variance. 
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